Personal Autonomy and the Autonomy of Artificial Intelligence Systems, or why Algorithmic Computing Systems Will Not Be Recognized as Subjects of Law
Abstract
The author analyzes concepts used in attempts to determine the status of an artificial intelligence (AI) system and its place in modern law. He notes the uniqueness of a person as a subject of law and compares the autonomy of the human will with the autonomy of the AI system. It is emphasized that AI systems, like animals, do not have legal personality due to the lack of autonomy of the will as an inherent property of the individual and the subject of law. According to the author, it calis precisely the lack of autonomy of will, one’s own goals and interests that does not allow us to talk about any subjectivity of AI systems, while the presence of cognitive abilities that allow solving various kinds of tasks cannot in itself serve as a basis for recognizing the subjectivity of programs or technical systems used to solve such tasks. Taking into account the fact that people acquire subjectivity within the framework of social relations by entering into such relations with each other, and not with AI, there is no possibility of recognizing AI as a participant in such relations, an as independent person and a subject of law.
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