SUMMARY OF THE ISSUE

Theory and in Philosophy of Psychology

E.N. Sokolov. Neurons of Consciousness

According to the hypothesis advanced by the author, consciousness emerges in specific neurons (the so-called neurons of consciousness) that together form hierarchic pyramids. The paper suggests an intercellular mechanism for consciousness based on quantum processes in microtubules of the cell skeletons of these neurons.

Theoretical and Empirical Research

E.A. Sergienko. Perception and Action: an Ontogenetic View of the Problem

On the basis of her own studies in the area of early ontogenesis, as well as of work by other researchers, the author argues that the single system of perception and action can be divided into two subsystems, that of perceptual control and that of identification or recognition. They differ in several regards: in ways of interacting with the world (allocentric vs. egocentric), in types of codifying and storing information (modality unspecific coding vs. modality specific coding), in degrees of awareness (higher degree of awareness is characteristic of the subsystem of identification), and in effects of anticipation (anticipation in time and space vs. selective anticipation). Both subsystems appear and develop from birth onward, but the subsystem of perceptual control reaches the stage of mature organisation earlier that the one that deals with identification. Although

they have different features, both subsystems are controlled by hierarchically organised representations. Either of them may become dominant in response to a certain task.

Special Theme of the Issue. Intelligence Tests: Pro and Contra

A.G. Shmelev. A Test as a Weapon

The discussion around tests has its deeper roots in the crisis of science and methodology in Russia, in the immaturity of the professional community, and in the failure of state employment policy. The article uses the metaphor of a test as a weapon. Like weapons, tests give an advantage to their owner and, like weapons, they may cause harm. This metaphor throws new light on such features of tests as their reliability, validity, and trustworthiness. The confusion about tests, when it arises, is mostly caused by their incompetent use.

D.B. Bogoiavlenskaia. What do Tests of Intelligence and Creativity Show?

The author provides her own interpretation of what intelligence and creativity tests reveal. The author shows that creativity tests, based on the notion of creativity as divergent thinking, cannot be valid. This notion of creativity contrasts with another notion which originates in philosophy and the human sciences and which is shared by the Russian psychological tradition. The author refers to her own conception of creativity, in which she uses a notion of the unit of analysis. Finally, the author offers a new method of psychological diagnostics, the validity of which has been proved by both theoretical and experimental research.

M.N. Kholodnaia. Psychological Testing and the Right of a Person to Chose Her/His own Path of Development

The article deals with the problems of psychological diagnostics of a person's intellectual abilities. The author argues that, when interpreting the results of intelligence testing of a particular individual (whether child or adult), it is neither possible to diagnose correctly the person's real intellectual resources nor predict the direction in which this potential will develop. The article discusses professional and ethical principles of applying intelligence tests as well as the social and ideological aspects of testing. Arguing from a stated developmental paradigm, the author attempts to draw limits within which psychometric intelligence tests can be used, and she also addresses the issue of protecting the rights of a personality.

D.V. Ushakov. Intelligence Tests, or the Bitter Taste of Self-Knowledge

The article presents data in support of the high prognostic validity of intelligence tests and of their capacity to predict achievement in learning, professional work, and social status. The structuraland-dynamic theory of intelligence developed by the author both offers an explanation of the prognostic power of intelligence tests and draws the line beyond which it may vanish. The author argues that intelligence tests are more than mere measuring tools: using them, psychologists affect their subject. He suggests ways along which the praxiology of testing, that is, a science of the practical use of tests, could develop.