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# In Search of the Regulatory Optimum for Digital Platforms: A Comparative Analysis



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## **Abstract**

The rapid growth of digital platforms and ecosystems has become a significant economic phenomenon on a global scale. This growth is due to the ability of these platforms to provide additional and flexible opportunities that are mutually beneficial for sellers, buyers, and platform workers. Because of it the activities of digital platforms have a positive impact on the overall gross domestic product of countries worldwide. The focus of the study is made on the regulatory frameworks for digital platforms both in Russia and around the world, including the rights and obligations of owners, operators, and users resulting from their participation in market transactions. The study does not include digital platforms used in the public sector or social media and messaging services. Scholar methods: comparative legal, formal logic, formal doctrinal, historical legal, as well as analytical, synthetic, and hermeneutical methods are systematically and integrally applied in the research. Based on the sources material, a hypothesis has been proposed regarding three stages of platform regulation growth globally and in Russia. Upon the results of an analysis of the three-stage evolutionary process of legal regulation for e-commerce, it has been

found that there is commonly inconsistent impact of various branches of law on the different areas of social relations or different types of platforms. Among this inconsistency are legal gaps and conflicts of legal rules, which make benefits for stakeholders spontaneous rather than the result of systematic interaction within the regulatory framework. Authors of the article identify a major source of legal uncertainty: the absence of standardized terms and harmonized regulatory principles that account for the unique nature of cross-industry digital economy. Lessons from global jurisdictions and three stages of e-commerce regulation reveal that, in its latest phase, the platform economy necessitates system of tailored legal definitions to manage its multifaceted activities. The survey proposes such conceptual structures that may be employed in Russian legal system. They reflect the multidimensional nuances of civil, tax, competition, information, and administrative laws. Additionally, a balanced scheme of general principles has been developed that would ensure the transparent interaction of digital platforms with society, the state, and economic entities.



### Keywords

e-commerce; digital platforms; platform economy; Big Tech; platforms' intermediary role; legal glossary; *primum non nocere*.

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## Introduction

History offers numerous examples that support the thesis that the development of socio-economic formations often outpaces the development of the legal institutions that regulate them. For instance, during the period of active capitalist development in Europe, there was a discrepancy between the needs of the burgeoning market economy and the archaic feudal law that governed property and trade relations. Currently, digital platforms represent one of the most striking examples of this kind on a similar scale, as they have already had a significant impact on the structure and principles of trade, introducing the transnational principle into the ways where goods and services are acquired.

Like many other economic and technological innovations before them, digital platforms have been emerging within legal regimes that were developed earlier without considering their specifics. Therefore, the functioning of such economically significant institutions outside a properly adjusted legal framework inevitably leads to conflicts.

For the optimal development of an institution that has a direct and substantial impact on everyday market relations, it is necessary to maintain a sort of rational alignment between the objectives of legal regulation and the goals pursued by the corresponding innovative economic institutions. Such alignment will optimize the impact of legal norms on economic processes, entrenching predictability and stability, while maintaining the potential for innovative development.

The lack of a congruent economic and legal model to regulate digital platforms, taking into account their structural and organizational features, may increase the risks of loss in terms of both stability and progress. This principle aligns with the tenets of rational choice theory and new institutionalism [North D.C., 1990]; [Haggard S., Tiede L., 2011).

Incongruent economic and legal models in the case of a digital platform may lead to market failures due to futile regulatory measures. Excessive regulatory stringency, disproportionate to the potential benefit, may hinder the utilization of useful properties of a product or service, at the same time the objectives of law (stability, security, etc.) may be achieved through less invasive means. Over regulation may lead to an artificial increase in prices or a decrease in the accessibility of goods.

Conversely, the absence of proper regulation may produce harm to consumers as actors, whole market and, finally, society. *Non liquet*<sup>1</sup> situations create conditions for abuse or opportunism on the part of digital platform owners and operators, whose large-scale actions may threaten national security. Thus, what matters is not just the presence of regulation *per se*, but its adequacy and relevance to the innovative aspect of the platform economy.

In view of what has been said, we are able define the current state of the legal regulation of digital platforms. Firstly, for objective reasons, the activity of digital platforms, one of the most prominent phenomena of the recent technological advancement, did not initially have comprehensive legal regulation, although such activity certainly requires regulation due to the risks of opportunism, monopolization, and market control by major business players. Secondly, such regulation must be congruent with the goals of the corresponding economic sector so as not to become an artificial inhibiting factor in its development. Thirdly, the legal regulation should be in terms of *lex specialis*, clear and specific, since setting an ex-

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<sup>1</sup> Literally — it is not clear (Latin). A legal lacuna or absence of clear legal regulation.

cessively broad “normative framework” will not contribute to achieving the stated goals, at the same time leading to either a broad interpretation of the norms or giving rise to circumventive schemes.

As a methodological guide to work on such a complex interdisciplinary problem the principle of *primum non nocere* is widely and justifiably applied, which means that the optimum regulatory framework begins where the effective development of the economic institution continues [Lofstedt R.E., 2003: 36–43]; [Rylova M.A., 2014: 30–42), the effectiveness meaning the interests of both the institution and the customers are taken into account. The main task of the work is answering the question of how to design harmonious and balanced law-making initiatives for the economic phenomenon under consideration. The answer requires application of inductive method and critical analysis of the legal experience in the field in foreign jurisdictions.

In contrast to traditional views that primarily consider digital platforms as tools (whether seen as complex software systems, innovative business models, or technological infrastructure), the article proposes a fundamentally different conceptualization. Digital platforms are viewed as an innovative form of market organization and economic activity with an intermediary function.

This approach implies that platforms do not simply facilitate economic processes, but help to form new market structures, redefine relationships between participants while creating entirely new types of value. For example, marketplaces are not average online stores; they represent complex digital products — market mechanisms in which millions of sellers and buyers interact with each other, forming a global market accessible to everyone. At the same time, the term “marketplace” has not yet been legally enshrined in any country in the world.

Thus, the main research problem is the absence of established *lex specialis* legal norms regarding the platform economy in Russia, and the study is focused on the legal regulation of the platform economy; the authors consider a number of specific types (kinds) of digital platforms operating in the field of electronic commerce (e-commerce).

The relevance of regulatory issues in the field of the digital platform and ecosystem market is explained by several facts. In many countries the platform economy serves as one of the leading drivers of economic development and growth, creating new trade flows, accelerating the inflow of resources, and stimulating entrepreneurial activity [Paun C., Ivascu C. et al., 2024].

On the one hand, platforms lower entry barriers for new market participants. On the other hand, they unite various economic entities, from small businesses to large enterprises, unifying the rules of competition [Hossain M.B. et al., 2022: 162–178]. The spread of platform economic forms occurs more discretely than evolutionarily, which raises questions that require clarification within the existing legal system.

The very activity of digital platforms does not contradict legal norms and develops as a legitimate way of conducting trade within the current framework of civil law. But, as they grow, platforms develop their own complex economic structures functioning according to their own specific internal principles and producing noticeable effect on the market. In this regard, *lex specialis* regulation becomes a necessary step to protect a balance of interests and to prevent abuses caused by the dominant position of the platform.

Though an innovative market form with the function of intermediary, the phenomenon of digital platforms mirrors the success of electronic commerce in the 2010s in its form of dissemination of goods. Even then it was emphasized that online commerce (Kenney M. et al., 2016: 61–69) is a significant driver of not only competition but also innovation: as companies competed for consumer attention, breakthrough technologies for recommendation systems and user-friendly interfaces were developed (Deldjoo Y. et al., 2024: 69–108). Online commerce experienced significant growth during the COVID-19 pandemic. According to Statista data<sup>2</sup>, the dynamics of revenue from retail trade in e-commerce show a pronounced peak in growth during lockdowns, followed by a slowdown as restrictive measures were lifted.

In the markets of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter — PRC), the European Union (hereinafter — EU), the Russian Federation (hereinafter — Russia, RF), and the Republic of Korea (hereinafter — RK), the ratio of online and offline sales is approaching equilibrium from 2026 onwards. In contrast, the United States of America (hereinafter—USA) market demonstrates sustained growth in e-commerce and the platform economy.

Overall, there is a global trend towards an increase in the share of online commerce, albeit with varying intensity in different regions. For example, in China the share of online commerce will grow from 12.3% in

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<sup>2</sup> Available at: URL: <https://www.statista.com/markets/413/e-commerce/> (accessed: 10.04.2025)

2017 to almost 40% by 2029, and in the United States — from 17.7% to more than 43% over the same period. In Russia and the EU countries, this growth is more moderate, but even there the online segment shows a steady rise (from 4.1% to 8.8% in Russia and from 8.4% to 17.2% in the EU). These differences may be due to several factors, including the level of infrastructure development, consumer behavior patterns, and cultural traditions.

Given the multifaceted nature of the issue, further research requires addressing a key question: how is platform economy regulation understood and what are the boundaries of the applicability of various measures aimed at achieving common economic well-being? The relevance of the question is due to the lack of clear definitions of digital platforms and their characteristics in contemporary scholarly publications [Heimburg V., Wiesche M., 2023: 72–85].

The lack of systematization of regulatory approaches and the absence of uniform criteria for assessing their effectiveness in the USA, PRC, EU, and RK, caused by legal and technical difficulties in distinguishing participants in market processes, hinders the development of regulatory acts and limits the use of foreign legal experience, impeding the formation of a consistent and predictable legal environment. In this regard, it seems that the principle of *primum non nocere* should underlie the regulation of platforms, minimizing unforeseen negative consequences, and ensuring economic growth, and the development of a high-quality legal glossary is a necessary condition for balanced regulation of the platform economy.

To maintain the correctness and validity of legal terminology, it is necessary to study the experience of jurisdictions where the platform economy has become widespread and regulated. The absence of a specifically adjusted regulatory framework (comprising both reliable legal definitions and principles providing a solid normative ground for subsequent legal rules) may lead to abuse of a dominant position, concentration of market power, and unfair competition on behalf of Big-Tech. Alternately, excessively strict regulation can reduce market share and the quality of platform functioning. The lacuna that this research aims to fill is the deficiency of a systematic analysis of both foreign and Russian experience that may be valuable in elaboration of adequate definitions, and subsequently, approaches to the regulation of the platform economy.

## **1. Stages of Development of E-Commerce Regulation in Foreign Jurisdictions**

In developed countries the transformation of legal regulation of the platform economy represents an evolutionary process of adapting legislation to the dynamic development of e-commerce. In this case, e-commerce is understood as a phenomenon preceding the emergence of the platform economy. At the same time, the development of the economic institution of platforms itself in many jurisdictions outpaces the formation of unified approaches to legal regulation [Shelepov A.V., Kolmar O.I., 2024: 110–126]. This mismatch is expressed in the heterogeneity of regulatory strategies, due to differences in the pace of digital service development and in the priorities of national policy. A comprehensive study of this phenomenon is a separate analytical task, requiring the identification of an optimal balance between stimulating competition, protecting consumer rights, promoting innovation, and ensuring national economic security through the development of management models adapted to local economic conditions [Lafuente E. et al., 2024: 36–43].

Despite differences in national approaches, three stages in the development of e-commerce regulation can be identified; they reflect the general patterns of increasing complexity of legal constructions requiring an appropriate response from the legislator. A detailed analysis of these stages is necessary to predict further evolution of legal norms, to prepare in time the legislative framework for new challenges of the platform economy.

The first stage has started in the early 21st century with the formation of a primary legal base for typical trading operations on the Internet. The key task was to protect the consumer as the most vulnerable party in retail trade relations, considering the specifics of online transactions. During this period, norms were developed to ensure the transparency of transaction terms, protection against unscrupulous sellers, and dispute resolution mechanisms. Legislative bodies sought to protect consumer rights and promote the development of new digital forms of economic activity.

An example is the EU E-Commerce Directive (Directive 2000/31/EC), aimed at preserving legal certainty, protecting consumer rights, and creating a legal framework for the free movement of goods and information. Later, the EU Consumer Rights Directive (Directive 2011/83/EU)



was passed, representing a comprehensive regulatory act aimed at protecting consumer rights, including in the digital environment.

Similar trends were observed in the RK, where the Act on Promotion of Information and Communication Network Utilization and Information Protection and the Act on Consumer Protection in Electronic Commerce were approved. The purpose of the latter was to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of consumers by establishing fair trade rules and promoting sustainable development of the national economy. Similar norms ensuring consumer protection were adopted in the USA (Restore Online Shoppers' Confidence Act (ROSCA; 2010) and the PRC (E-Commerce Law of the People's Republic of China of 2018).

It is important the initial measures taken by the Korean and Chinese authorities, despite their apparent «belatedness,» were a response to the same challenges that the mentioned above acts of other states dealt with and therefore these measures in South Korea and China are consistent with the concept of the first stage of e-commerce regulation.

At the first stage the regulatory approach reflected the recognition of the relationship between the development of digital platforms and e-commerce and ensuring consumer confidence, as well as providing them with guarantees of protection against potential risks associated with remote transactions. Legislators sought a balance between innovation and security, introducing norms governing issues of transparency, consumer rights to return goods and services, as well as providing dispute resolution mechanisms.

The legal frameworks developed for early e-commerce proved insufficient for regulating evolving digital platforms. The initial emphasis on regulating e-commerce, specifically focused on «seller-buyer» type of transactions, proved insufficient to cover the entire spectrum of interactions and risks arising within the platform economy. The need to adapt legal regulation was due to the increasing complexity of the structure of new digital forms of economic activity, including the emergence of platform ecosystems, the use of artificial intelligence and algorithmic trading, the application of technologies for tracking personal preferences, and the integration of social networks into sales channels.

The transition to the next stage of development of legal regulation was due to the realization of the inadequacy of existing norms to ensure comprehensive protection of consumer rights; there arose the need to expand the scope of regulation to cover new types of activities and



their emerging risks, particularly those related to the quality control of products distributed through digital platforms. The measures taken at subsequent stages only partially filled the existing gaps, as will be shown below.

The second stage in 2010s is characterized by the expansion of the scope of legal regulation to cover issues of consumer personal data protection, as a response to the growth of online commerce and the increase in the volume of user data. The goal was to create legal mechanisms that guarantee the confidentiality and protection of users personal information.

In the EU, the General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR) was adopted in 2016, establishing uniform standards for the processing of personal data. In RK, the Personal Information Protection Act was passed in 2011, and in PRC, the Personal Information Protection Law came into force in 2021.

In the USA, the regulation of the protection of personal data of digital platform users is mainly carried out at the state level. For example, in California, where this issue is regulated in terms of protecting the constitutional right to privacy (California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003), supplemented in 2013, California Consumer Privacy Act (2018), and California Privacy Rights Act (2020), approved by local referendum, that strengthens the regulation of the previous act. These laws establish increased guarantees and stricter requirements for the processing of personal data, akin to the approaches laid down in the GDPR (EU).

Thus, the second stage is characterized by the recognition of the importance of personal data protection as the influence of digital platforms grew and by the adoption of relevant legislation. However, the approach to regulation based on understanding a digital platform as a tool for transactions, rather than as an independent intermediary, creates risks of incorrect law enforcement. Insufficient attention to the role of the platform as an intermediary operating with personal data, as well as the lack of continuity with the previous stage of regulation and the absence of a comprehensive approach potentially reduces the force of personal data protection and creates transaction costs for consumers and entrepreneurs.

The third, current stage of legal regulation development of the platform economy that started in the early 2020s represents a response to the increasing complexity of the platform economy structure and strengthening the dominant positions of large digital platforms. This stage logi-

cally continues answering the questions that arose at the previous stage. The increase in computing power and the volume of processed data and the spread of intelligent algorithms have allowed platforms to accumulate not only users personal data, but also to control significant arrays of information, whose leakage may be a threat to national security.

Platforms have gained the ability to use the accumulated data and to apply artificial intelligence for commercial and other purposes. This advancement has created the preconditions for obtaining a monopoly, or dominant position in the markets, and displacing competitors who is still using traditional forms of trade. This situation contradicts the principles of achieving general economic equilibrium and efficient allocation of resources, which, for instance, the Cournot model describes as the advantages of perfect competition in comparison to an oligopolistic market.

A visible trend of monopolization is currently traced in large digital economies, which confirms the expediency of the third stage of regulation. Due to the «scale effect» and «network effects,» one dominant company owning a popular digital platform may capture a significant market share, from 20% to 45%. This can be seen in China where T-mall has captured 45%, in the USA where 30% of the market belongs to Amazon (30%), in the EU countries Amazon's share is 20% (see Figure 1). In contrast, in the smaller RK market, competition remains more balanced, and there are several large players present.

An unprecedented increase in the concentration of market power and global inequality observed in the PRC, USA, and EU countries, may lead to long-term instability. Thus, antitrust regulation, which has already played an important role in regulating traditional market relations between buyer and seller, must be adapted and strengthened to ensure balance and sustainable development in the digital environment. It is within the framework of solving antitrust problems, responding to the challenges posed by the dominant positions of large companies that the jurisdictions under consideration are working on the legal issues unresolved at the second regulation stage, insufficient attention to the specific intermediary role of platforms in the market being among them.

Countries with the highest market monopolization, PRC and EU, have adopted laws that correlate with the third stage of regulation. As part of the third stage, the EU has introduced a regulatory framework for the digital sector through the Digital Markets Act (2022) and the Digital Services Act (2022; hereinafter — DSA). The Digital Markets




Figure 1. Distribution of major players in the jurisdictions under consideration

Source: Statista.

Act (hereinafter—DMA) gives the European Commission the power to supervise large digital platforms (hereinafter — LDPs), defined as «gatekeepers.» The DMA aims to create fair and competitive conditions for business and end users. «Gatekeepers» are defined as entities providing «core platform services» (hereinafter — CPS), listed in Art. 2, they are to meet the quantitative thresholds for revenue and active user reach, which are specified in Art. 3, with the aim of presuming the materiality of their impact on the market. In addition, to confirm this official status a decision by the European Commission is required, the status is received by the platforms after notifying the commission of reaching the specified thresholds.

Both acts mentioned above manifest the EU’s comprehensive approach, based on assessing the scale of digital platform activities and

imposing additional obligations on LDPs due to their significant market power and potential risks to the stability of civil commerce. The DMA and DSA pay particular attention to the operational activities, duties and responsibilities of large, dominant digital platforms (hereinafter — DDPs), with targeted legal approaches based on the specifics of the regulated legal relations, which clearly demonstrates the regulator's special attention to creating a fair competitive environment.

In China, the regulation of digital platforms relies on the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (反垄断法), passed in 2008. Key amendments affecting the activities of digital platforms came into force on August 1, 2022. The Anti-monopoly Law implies the possibility of adopting subordinate acts and interpretations. In 2021 the State Council of China has passed the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines (guidance) for the platform economy.

Currently China is working on detailing special requirements for digital platform operators through several subordinate acts that are in the public consultation stage. In October 2021, a draft of the Guiding Principles was published, proposing a classification of digital platforms; the criteria to differentiate platforms are such as the main scope of activity, the number of active users, and market capitalization. In accordance with the Principles for Classification and Categorization of Internet Platforms, issued by the State Administration for Market Regulation, six types of digital platforms are distinguished: online sales intermediary platforms, life services platforms, social entertainment platforms, information platforms, financial services platforms, and computing services platforms.

Along with this, the Chinese authorities have recently undertaken several comprehensive changes to subordinate antitrust regulation to take into consideration the specifics of relations developing in the digital economy. All changes were the subject of open discussion with the participation of authorities, experts, and representatives of the real sector. Thus, in 2023, the State Administration for Market Regulation of the PRC has issued the Provisions on Prohibiting Abuse of Dominant Market Positions (禁止滥用市场支配地位行为规定), which has prohibited dominant platforms from using the data they obtained or their algorithms, technologies, or rules to take actions aimed at abusing their dominant position in the market.

According to this document, a dominant market position is recognized if the operator can control prices, volumes, or other transactional

conditions, or could prevent or influence the entry of other operators into the market. In addition, regulatory changes were also expressed in the Provisions on the Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements (禁止垄断协议规定) prohibiting digital platforms from using the data obtained, existing algorithms, technologies, and platform rules to enter into horizontal and vertical monopoly agreements through the communication of their intentions in any form, the exchange of confidential information, or the establishment of coordinated actions.

For example, collusion with the aim of applying the same algorithms and platform rules to calculate the prices of different sellers, profiting from maintaining fixed prices, as well as the coordinated distribution of sales or procurement markets are not allowed. In recent years, the PRC has also paid attention to one of the identified problematic aspects concerning data protection. On September 30, 2024, the State Council of the PRC has issued the Regulations on Network Data Security Management, it came into force on January 1, 2025.

The document focuses on issues of cyber security, data confidentiality, and introduces rules prohibiting operators from using data to discriminate against users or suppliers. The rules have extraterritorial effect and apply to platforms that carry out network data processing both within the territory of the PRC and abroad, if this activity may harm national security, public interest, or the legitimate interests of citizens of the PRC. The rules cover the protection of not only personal information, but also any other information processed and generated through Internet networks, depending on three data categories — general data, important data, and core data.

General standards for information protection in China involve cumulative measures taken by data operators depending on the three indicated data categories. Special attention is paid to the protection of important data; that includes information that, in the event of forgery, destruction, leakage, illegal acquisition, or illegal use, could threaten national security, economic activity, social stability, healthcare, and the safety of the population of the PRC. Owners of important data are subject to increased information security requirements: they are to conduct a full-scale risk assessment annually and before each transfer of such data to a third party, as well as to report on the technologies used to protect such data.

The Regulations introduce special rules emphasizing the need for special attention to dominant platforms:

platforms processing data of more than 10 million people are required to comply with the standards applicable to owners of «important data»;

«big (large) platforms» are required to refrain from using data, algorithms, or user conditions to carry out unfair and misleading actions, such as forced data processing or discrimination against users; to oversee personal data protection they are required to establish an independent supervisory body consisting of both employees and external experts; they are to publish an annual report on social responsibility in terms of personal data protection.

The regulation of digital platforms in the PRC is characterized by a comprehensive and strict approach aimed at ensuring competition and data protection. Its features include the recognition of significance of platforms as an independent type of activity, an emphasis on antitrust regulation, strict requirements for data protection, extraterritorial effect of legislation, and increased control over large platforms. This reflects a desire for comprehensive control and the specifics of the country's political and economic system.

The Republic of Korea, in turn, demonstrates a softer approach to regulating digital platforms. In 2021 amendments were imposed into the Telecommunications Business Act, prohibiting app store operators from unfair practices against app developers. Currently, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter — KFTC) and the government are discussing additional regulatory measures, including the requirement for the operators of foreign platforms to appoint a representative in Korea and the encouragement of self-regulation.

On January 12, 2023 the KFTC has published the «Guidelines for Reviewing Abuses of Dominant Market Positions by Online Platform Operators» (Online Platform Monopoly Guidelines), clarifying anti-trust legislation. Moreover, on September 11, 2024, the KFTC has announced a new regulatory roadmap, proposing the following amendments to the recently approved Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (hereinafter — MRFTA). At the same time, the Chairman of the Commission has noted that, despite the initially different concept, a decision was made to take an alternative path of developing precise threshold values for establishing a presumption of market dominance, after which a strict list of prohibited actions is applied (as opposed to the EU approach, where platform regulation operates on the principle of «ex-ante,» i.e., preventive intervention to prevent abuses). The development of regulation will be conducted for six types of platforms: transaction in-

termediary platforms, search engines, video platforms, social networks, operating systems and advertising platforms.

A distinctive feature of regulation in the Republic of Korea is their active promotion of self-regulation of the platform economy industry. In July 2022, the Platform Regulatory Council was established, and in August of the same year, the Non-Governmental Self-Regulatory Organization for Digital Platforms (Platform SRO), operating in four divisions: platform and business user relations, consumers, data and artificial intelligence, and innovation and management. Despite the advantages of self-regulation, the KFTC insists on the need to introduce additional rules for large digital platforms. The delay in legislative decisions may be due to the dominance of USA platforms, which introduces a cross-border element and a clash of economic and political interests.

In the USA, the third stage of regulation development also fell on the period from the early 2020s and it is characterized by a reaction to market abuses by digital giants and by conflicting interactions between stakeholders, as well as obstacles to legislative decisions due to opposition from dominant corporations. In 2020, the Judiciary Committee of the US House of Representatives has published a report presenting evidence of anti-competitive behavior by large technology companies. The US Congress today has two bipartisan bills approved by specialized committees: the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (AICOA) and the Open App Markets Act (OAMA).

AICOA affects resources with more than 50 million active users per month in the USA (or at least 100,000 active business users per month) and a market capitalization of at least \$600 billion, related to: the creation and exchange of content, search, or the sale, delivery, or advertising of goods or services. In fact, the bill is to affect Google, Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, etc. OAMA concerns app stores and related operating systems, such as iOS, Apple App Store, Google Play and Android, Microsoft Store on Windows, and so on.

In the USA, two definitive types of digital platforms are designed — in relation to app stores and in relation to other digital platforms, including digital giants. OAMA is focused on suppressing self-preferencing practices of app stores, and AICOA contains a number of more detailed and highly specialized requirements aimed at a wider segment of the platform economy. In addition to prohibiting self-preference, AICOA contains prescriptions that include prohibitions on discrimination against users, restricting access without using other platform products,



using non-public data of business users to compete with their products, hindering access to user-generated data, and hindering the removal of pre-installed software or changing default settings.

Although AICOA and OAMA have not yet come into force, the first decentralized steps have already been taken in the USA to curb the anti-competitive activities of platforms. In 2020 the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California considered two disputes in a lawsuit filed by Epic Games against Google and Apple, the decisions on which became precedents. In the case against Google, the jury has found Google's actions to be anti-competitive practices with the properties of a monopoly. The court has issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the obstruction of the installation of alternative app stores for Android, as well as the payment of incentives or the provision of discounts to developers who release applications exclusively through the Play Store. In the case against Apple, the court has found the company's practice of preventing users from switching to other sites and app stores (anti-steering policies) to be a violation of antitrust law.

A comparison of the digital platform regulation in the RK, USA, PRC and EU demonstrates a variety of approaches: from an emphasis on self-regulation in Korea to attempts to adopt large-scale legislative acts in the USA and strict state control and the extraterritorial effect of legislation in the PRC. The most comprehensive, but also the most controversial, is the approach to regulating and defining large platforms in the EU (DMA and DSA).

The experience reviewed shows that all jurisdictions strive to ensure competition, data protection, and consumer rights. Thus, legal systems are adapting to the challenges of the platform economy — albeit with varying degrees of stringency. The above mentioned court decisions demonstrate the relevance of the problem: the absence of proper legislative regulation leads to fragmented and complicated resolution of fair trade issues involving digital giants, which does not provide proportionate restraint of dominant position abuses. Court decisions confirm the illegitimacy of burdensome conditions imposed by digital giants on counterparts, which ultimately affects consumers negatively.

The third stage is regulatory consistent: the rules of antitrust and civil law regulation, as well as the protection of user data, form independent characteristics of digital platform services. As the quality of these services affects the state of competition, reasonably high special requirements, including strict prohibitions, must be imposed on their provision, which corresponds to the regulatory policy initiated in the 21st century.

Generally, the third stage reveals the relationship between regulatory and terminological problems: the lack of clear-cut definitions of platform economy concepts makes it difficult to distinguish the interests of participants and to regulate platform economy with purpose. The need for high-quality legal definitions is due to the need to distinguish platform activities from other activity types, to identify the features of the independence of platform services, to take into account their impact on competition, and to determine the criteria for significant types of digital platforms. The introduction of a criteria-based distinction between a digital platform, its types, operators, business users, and consumers is an urgent task, since the absence of such a distinction is a source of collisions.

The analysis of foreign experience mentioned demonstrates the evolution of digital platform regulation, where each stage consistently solved arising problems, but the dynamics of the platform economy led to the emergence of new challenges. Despite the progress in antitrust regulation, data protection, and terminological certainty, a comprehensive approach considering the specifics of the national economic environment remains key to success. Thus, the analysis of the regulatory environment of the Russian Federation, with its unique features, such as the influence of tax legislation, is of particular interest for the development of an adaptive and balanced model to regulate the platform economy.

## **2. Experience in Regulating E-commerce in Russia: Analysis of the Legal Framework During the Three Stages**

An examination of foreign experience in regulating the platform economy has revealed three distinct stages in the evolution of legal rules. The following analysis will focus on legislative solutions adopted in Russia during the periods comparable to the identified stages of foreign regulatory development. The purpose of this section is to identify directions for further regulatory development, considering both compliance with global trends, taking into account the specific aspects of taxation, and the need to address current and potential issues in the platform economy.

Particular attention will be paid to analyzing the compliance of Russian regulations with the second and third stages of regulation development, which correspond to data protection issues and the implementation of a comprehensive approach to regulation. This focus will allow to identify areas requiring improvement and to formulate practical recommendations for legislative development.

At the first stage the primary consumer protection measures were taken, the key event was the introduction of the concept of distance selling of goods in Article 26.1 of the Law of the Russian Federation No. 2300-1 of February 7, 1992, "On Protection of Consumer Rights" (hereinafter—the Consumer Rights Protection Law). This measure has allowed for the adaptation of consumer protection mechanisms to the specifics of online commerce, like establishing requirements for information about product, the right to refuse goods, and quality guarantees. At the same time, this step has laid the foundation for regulating relations in the digital environment but focused primarily on the classic "seller-consumer" model, which implies only the fact of purchase and sale and the interaction of the seller and consumer without digital inter mediation.

The second stage was characterized by expanding the scope of regulation to digital aggregators. Federal Law No. 112-FZ of May 5, 2014 has enshrined the freedom to choose the form of payment in the Consumer Rights Protection Law, and Federal Law No. 266-FZ of July 1, 2021 has established safe legal framework for the collection and analysis of consumer data. An important innovation was the definition of "Owner of an aggregator platform for goods (services) information" which made it possible to extend consumer guarantees to digital platforms. Moreover, Federal Laws No. 250-FZ of July 29, 2018, and No. 135-FZ of May 1, 2022 have specified the provisions of the Consumer Rights Protection Law regarding the liability of aggregator owners for their misconduct. Thus, the consolidation of the status of aggregator was an important step in adapting legislation to the realities of the platform economy, which blur the traditional boundary between a seller and an intermediary. However, there remains a need for further detailing the responsibility of aggregators and platform operators, as well as distinguishing their functions. The proximity of the concept of "aggregator owner" to the definition of "digital platform owners" (Zap'yantsev A.A., 2024: 57–60) indicates the potential for unifying terminology and developing regulation.

At the second stage of the development of platform economy regulation in the Russian Federation, an approach was formed to the distribution of rights and obligations of sellers, aggregator owners, and consumers, it aimed at ensuring guarantees of consumer rights in digital commerce and creating conditions for business development.

The analysis of the digital commerce market structure in Russia (Figure 2) reveals relatively balanced competition, characterized by the presence of several major players. The Republic of Korea has a similar situation, with a specific regulatory approach including the elements of

self-regulation being developed. The competitive environment in Russia, unlike the USA, EU, or China, may be due to the smaller economic scale of digital markets, as well as due to regulatory policies to maintain stable relationships between market participants. It should be noted that the data collected in Figure 2 requires additional studies to identify the specific factors influencing the market structure and to assess the utility of regulatory measures.




Figure 2. Distribution of major digital market players in Russia

Source: Statista.

In line with the foreign trends in legislative development, Federal Law No. 301-FZ of July 10, 2023, «On Amendments to the Federal Law «On Protection of Competition»» (the fifth antimonopoly package), was passed in Russia as part of the third development stage of regulatory policy regarding digital commerce. The law aims to strengthen control over the activities of large digital platforms and to prevent abuses of dominant market positions. Law No. 298-FZ introduces amendments to antimonopoly regulation adapted to the specifics of digital platforms, expanding the criteria for determining a dominant position, strengthening liability for anti-competitive agreements (including those using algorithms), requiring transparency of algorithms and data, and expanding the powers of the Federal Antimonopoly Service. The passing of the fifth antimonopoly package demonstrates the Russian legislator's desire to follow foreign trends in regulating the digital economy and countering anti-competitive practices of large digital platforms.

However, the analysis of legislation reveals the lack of unified terminological apparatus, in particular, the absence of a clear definition

of «digital platform.» It is assumed that the absence of clear definitions may lead to ambiguous interpretations of the law, problems in qualifying entities falling under its scope, and, as a result, difficulties in law enforcement and the potential violation of the principle of equality before the law. For better implementation of the provisions of the fifth antimonopoly package, advancement of legislative and regulatory acts is required, as is the formation of judicial practices that reflect the unique aspects of digital markets.

Overall, Russia still lacks comprehensive regulation of digital platforms, and the conceptual apparatus of Law No. 298, although it appeared to be a major step forward, was not designed to cover all intersector regulation. The fragmentation of definitions in the field of digital commerce creates risks for businesses and requires significant resources to ensure compliance with numerous acts. Despite the general regulatory impact of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (hereinafter — the Civil Code) and the Tax Code of the Russian Federation (hereinafter — the Tax Code) on civil and tax relations involving digital platforms, there is no dedicated regulation that considers the specifics of the platform economy. They do not constitute regulation of the platform economy as such. Instead, they regulate general civil and tax relations digital platforms are involved in. The Civil Code governs the relationship between the platform and user-contractors (agency, commission, performance of services) and between user-contractors and customers (conclusion of contracts, purchase and sale, contract, performance of services).

Furthermore, unlike trading aggregators with transparent payments, information platforms (classifieds websites and social networks) create risks of incomplete reflection of users income, requiring increased attention from tax authorities. At the same time, the Tax Code establishes general rules for paying personal income tax and corporate income tax. However, unlike trading digital aggregators (marketplaces), where payment for transactions is transparent, information platforms (classifieds, social networks), providing only information services without recording contacts and payments, create a situation in which users may not account for income, despite the generally applicable norms of tax legislation. There is no specific regulation of classifieds activities in this respect.

It is worth noting that measures have been taken within the framework of the third stage of regulation to specialize tax regimes for digital platforms. Article 208 of the Tax Code has introduced a rule for taxable income to include remuneration for work, services, and intellectual property rights

provided/granted via the Internet using the Russian domain zone or hardware located in the Russian Federation. This rule also applies to individual entrepreneurs, platform owners providing intermediary services. This provision aims to increase tax collection on income received through Russian digital platforms and to establish equal taxation conditions for various types of activities. However, the force of this rule will be determined by its application and the ability of tax authorities to identify cases where income from activities on digital platforms is not fully accounted for.

The latest amendments to the Tax Code (Article 284) address the taxation of income from the provision of services on the Internet placing advertisements and offers, but marketplaces, taxi and food ordering services qualify for exemption from tax. This exemption, along with the terminological heterogeneity inherent in the regulation of digital platforms, may indicate the need for further systematization of approaches. It is assumed that the general norms of the Tax Code on taxation of corporate profits apply to these three types of platforms. Federal Law No. 422-FZ of November 27, 2018, «On Conducting an Experiment to Establish a Special Tax Regime «Tax on Professional Income»,» offers a clearer definition of digital platform operators, covering a wide range of participants in the platform economy, including large platforms.

Thus, the Federal Law mentioned, in the context of taxation, appears to be a more consistent and universal instrument for digital platform regulation compared to individual provisions of the Tax Code, that, nevertheless, require further interpretation and harmonization with other regulatory acts.

It should be noted that, within the framework of the third stage of e-commerce regulation development, the Federal Tax Service (hereinafter — FTS) organized information exchange with 70 operators of digital platforms, including systemically important digital platforms of various types (Wildberries, You Do, Yandex Taxi, etc.), to simplify the tax payment procedure for users. Despite this initiative, which demonstrates progress in regulating platform activities, the overall extent of regulatory impact on the platform business remains uneven one. The discrepancy between the criteria for classifying entities as «operators of digital platforms» for the purposes of interaction with the FTS, on the one hand, and the definitions of digital platforms used in other sector laws, on the other, may reduce the predictability of legal relations with other regulatory authorities (e.g., Federal Service on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being, “Rospotrebnadzor”).

The above shows that, despite timely initiatives, the regulatory legal framework for digital platforms still may be described as fragmented and conflicting; that does not allow for the full realization of the digital commerce potential with the greatest benefits for the private sector (businesses and consumers) and with the least risks for the state. Thus, to strengthen and expand the progress achieved, it is necessary to move to the next stage of regulatory development, to unify and comprehensively systematize the regulatory legal framework which will be able to provide a clear system of rules for the digital market and to coordinate activities of various government bodies to ensure the stability and predictability of market relations.

The analysis of legal terminology has revealed an uneven coverage of various types of digital platforms, that factor raises, in some cases, the question of their eligibility for tax exemptions, as regulatory gaps can be profitably used by unscrupulous participants in digital commerce. The analysis is presented in detail in Table 1.

**Table 1.** Basic concepts used in Russian legislation as of 2024

Definition	Market-place	Classifies Websites	Online shop	Service intermediary
<b>1.</b> Law of the Russian Federation No. 2300-I of February 7, 1992, «On Protection of Consumer Rights», Preamble:  <b>Owner of an aggregator platform for goods (services) information</b>				
<b>2.</b> Federal Law No. 422-FZ of November 27, 2018, «On the Implementation of an Experiment to Establish a Special Tax Regime ‘Tax on Professional Income’»:  <b>Operator of an electronic platform</b>				
<b>3.</b> Federal Law No. 135-FZ of July 26, 2006, «On Protection of Competition»:				



Definition	Market- place	Classified Websites	Online shop	Service in- termediary
<b>Digital platform</b> (The scope includes only the category termed “Programs for electronic computing machines,” e.g. apps, whereas websites and information systems fall outside its scope)				
<b>4. Federal Law No. 289-FZ of August 3, 2018 «On Customs Regulation in the Russian Federation and on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation»:</b> <b>Trade platform (website)</b> (The scope includes only website, whereas “Programs for electronic computing machines” fall outside its scope)				
<b>5. Art. 147 Tax Code:</b> <b>Electronic trade platform</b>				
<b>6. Federal Law No. 149-FZ of July 27, 2006, «On Information, Information Technologies, and Information Protection»:</b> <b>Audiovisual service</b>				
Federal Law No. 149-FZ of July 27, 2006, «On Information, Information Technologies, and Information Protection»: <b>Classified ads service</b>				

Thus, the fragmented and inconsistent legislative regulation of digital platforms in the Russian Federation creates cognitive and transaction

costs for economic entities and consumers. These costs are due to the absence of a unified concept and clear criteria to distinguish between different types of platforms that simultaneously enter several types of legal relations. Moreover, such phenomenon as niche regulation provokes conflicts in law enforcement and reduces regulatory efficiency. As a result, the same platform *de facto* may fall under divergent regulatory regimes. This directly reduces the degree of legal certainty and transparency of requirements: for example, the definition of a social network in Article 10.6 of the Law on Information manifests incongruence with existing models of digital platforms, although nowadays remote commerce takes place through these networks very actively. The application of traditional legal constructs to digital platforms without considering their specifics is fraught with regulatory imbalance, since, for example, it is not always fair to assign responsibility for the quality of goods to the platform rather than to the seller.

Finally, the absence of legal rules that explicitly count the influence of algorithms hinders the implementation of tort liability for breaches of consumer rights. The lack of adequate regulation of digital platforms also creates risks for contractors (Silberman M.S., Harmon E., 2018: 911]; [Stewart A., Stanford J., 2017: 425), potentially leading to economic instability and increased social inequality (Drahokoupil J., Jespen M., 2017: 103]; Healy J. et al., 2017: 232–245]; [Lehdonvirta V., 2018: 19–29). In the long term, this may force platforms to take excessive preventive quality control measures, which would negatively affect user-contractors and the development of small and medium-sized businesses, as well as platform pricing policies, and it would ultimately negate the positive impact of the platform economy.

To preserve balanced development of the digital economy and to protect consumer rights, it is necessary to develop a *modus operandi* for interaction between participants in the platform economy. At the same time, it is advisable to establish a *praesumptio* of responsibility for the owner/operator of the platform for control of proper functioning of the algorithms and their correctness, for example, in cases when the digital elements of the platform, algorithms, violate consumer rights. It is also important to ensure compliance with the principles of *bona fide* by both platform owners and users, to strive for *status quo ante* in cases of violations of consumer rights, and to take into account the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* when elaborating regulation for contractual relations in the platform environment.

Additionally, it should be stated that the application of traditional legal norms disregarding the intermediary nature of platforms is fraught with unjustified imposition of liability. On the other hand, excessive regulation, coupled with high bureaucratic costs, is able to influence negatively small and medium-sized businesses and limit consumer choice.

Considering the above, it is important to emphasize that the regulation of the platform economy requires the creation of a systematic and uniform legislative framework that takes into consideration the specifics of digital platform activities and the interests of all stakeholders. Key to this is the recognition of platform intermediary function, the formation of a unified terminological apparatus, and the distribution of liability accordingly.

### **3. Legal Glossary as a Priority Task for Regulating the Platform Economy**

As demonstrated above, such regulation—with its significant divisions—creates risks for digital platforms, even in the case of gradual (evolutionary) development. Different requirements prescribed by classic branches of civil law vis-à-vis consumer protection provisions lead to contradictions in transactions. Differences in information law and personal data protection requirements hinder cross-border activities and confidentiality. Inconsistencies in antitrust regulation weaken the fight against unfair competition. As a result, the lack of a unified approach produces legal uncertainty and increases costs for platforms. This hinders their innovative development and the formation of a predictable environment for business.

Friedrich Hayek among others emphasized that economic success is based on the predictability of the legal reaction to the actions of economic agents (Hayek F., 1944). In this regard, to maintain system and uniformity of legal impact, it is necessary to harmonize the terminological apparatus in various branches of law applicable to digital platforms. This is particularly relevant for legal systems rooted in the continental tradition, which are built on a «structural» approach and heavily depend on a precise and coherent system of legal concepts enshrined in legislative texts. As A. Ortolani recently has noted aptly, the “tendency to organize knowledge in a well-ordered and cross-referenced system is a distinctive trait of the civil law tradition which continues today” [Ortolani A., 2024: 211–234].

The lack of a unified approach to regulation, manifested in the uncertainty of criteria for classifying entities as digital platforms, in the selective application of sector requirements to individual platforms, and in the absence of a general vector of applicable legislation interpretation, causes inevitably legal uncertainty. In addition, there is a dual paradox: the specialized regulation of several aspects of platform activity is characterized by a high degree of detail and technocracy, while there is no normative typology of platforms that distinguishes them by the specifics of their economic activity at the most general level even though such a typology is highly demanded. It is necessary for the adequate application of regulatory measures to various types of platforms.

A unified conceptual and terminological framework for application to the activities of digital platforms will be, logically, a necessary basis for the development of high-quality regulatory legal acts governing a specific product or a specific type of digital platform activity, since this is the only way on that the range of subjects and objects that legal norms affected may be clearly defined. As A. Strowel and J. Vergote have noted rightly [Strowel A., Vergote J., 2017], when developing a legal framework for regulating a platform market, it is most appropriate to first form a general (inter-sector) structure for regulating the digital economy (including the principles of regulating the platform economy and the terminological apparatus), and only after that to move on to more specific issues relating separately to various aspects of digital platform activities.

The comprehensive approach, which is overdue at the third stage of regulatory evolution, like any consolidation of law, will produce a positive influence on the development of relevant public relations, due to increased certainty, elimination of legal conflicts, and the construction of a clear system of interaction between citizens, businesses, and the state [Zhukov V.N., Frolova E.A., 2024]. Therefore, while finding the optimal legal regulation of the platform economy, it is necessary, first to define the concepts, as the adherents of classical legal positivism argued (Nersesyants V.S., 2003).

Thus, the primary task is to develop a precise terminological framework that adequately reflects both the general and specific characteristics of digital platform activities. Without a harmonized terminological understanding of phenomena, it is impossible to begin conceptualizing the principles of legal regulation, since these principles should be targeted at specific subjects and objects (digital platforms, intermediary digital services, independent remote employment or work, etc.) that have not yet been legally defined.

In this regard, the concepts projected defining the platform economy should contain the main features that distinguish the defined phenomenon from similar ones. Overburdening definitions with elements of legal regulation is not advisable. First, it is necessary to introduce a basic concept of «digital platform» and to define the types of digital platforms (marketplace, classified, etc.), considering the characteristics of each type when differentiating sector regulation to minimize negative effects and unjustified dominance of individual types. The diversity of digital platform types must be taken into account within the framework of further legal regulation.

When developing legal definitions within the Russian legal system, it is essential to ensure their alignment with the terminology of the Law on Information, the Civil Code, the Tax Code, the Customs Code of the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Consumer Rights Protection Law, which has become common in legal practice, in order to avoid large-scale changes in legislation. Otherwise, massive changes in the legislation of the Russian Federation and the EAEU will be inevitable.

Thus, considering the terminological constructions used in these legislative acts, it is proposed to understand a digital platform as a website and (or) a page of a website on the Internet, and (or) an information system, and (or) a computer program intended, and (or) used for the purpose of selling goods or works or services, which provides users with the opportunity to receive full information about such goods or works or services and about related offers to conclude a contracts of sale (including an agreements for performance of work or an agreements for performance of services), and, if applicable, that also allows to remotely conclude these contracts and make a down payment for these goods or works or services.

To define the burden of fulfilling obligations and to delimit responsibility for fulfilling the requirements that are imposed on digital platforms, it is necessary to understand adequately the difference between the owner and the operator of a digital platform. The owner of a digital platform is a natural person, including an individual entrepreneur, or a juridical person who has a legal title to the digital platform and is responsible for its strategic management and development. In turn, the operator of a digital platform is the owner of a digital platform (if the owner retains this functionality), or a person authorized by him, who administers the digital platform and ensures its functioning, including interaction with users of the digital platform.

Clarifying the definition of digital platforms in relation to the activities of trading digital aggregators — marketplaces — it is necessary to remember that they are entities regulated by most detailed legislation of the Russian Federation in comparison with other types of digital platforms. This is explained not only by their greatest popularity due to their direct daily work with consumer goods in demand (which affects the total consumer demand), but also by their business model, which assumes: establishing a direct contact between users (seller/contractor and buyer/customer), formalizing the relations through the conclusion of a public contract (Art. 426 of the Civil Code), payment for goods/services either directly on the digital platform or under the control of its operator (charging a fee by a partner on behalf, for example, at a point of issue or by a courier). Even more obvious is the presence of a conscious, purposeful contact between the operator of the digital platform and user contractors, who conclude one of the forms of inter mediation transaction to organize interaction between themselves and between contractors and customers to make a profit.

Thus, the business model of marketplaces has all the signs of the emergence of civil law relations and typical factual patterns that are amenable to generally accepted methods of legal regulation with the establishment of appropriate exceptions (features), where necessary. Given these considerations, it is not surprising that the Consumer Rights Protection Law — a key act regulating the procedure for the sale of goods, works and services to every person in everyday life — was one of the first to be extended to the activities of marketplaces. Moreover, the influence of this Law was extended to digital platforms without deconstructing its underlying concept and structure — the triad that has been in force for more than 30 years: «General Provisions — Consumer Rights in the Sale of Goods — Consumer Rights in the Performance of Work or Services.»

It should be stated the current legislation does not differentiate between services and goods in relation to digital platforms organized according to the marketplace business model. Consequently, digital platforms through which both goods and services are sold (for example, food ordering services are also considered aggregators and are covered by the concept of a marketplace from the point of view of the Consumer Rights Protection Law) fall under the concept of a marketplace (“aggregator owner” in the strict wording of the Law). It is also important that, in addition to the previously studied definition of the “aggregator owner”, the Law selectively incorporated this new participant in the consumer market into the current rules for selling goods, works and services to

consumers. At the same time, not all rules were extended to aggregators, but only the most significant from the point of view of protecting consumer rights and considering both the specifics of digital commerce and the need for its development in the future.

However, the concept of «aggregator owner» stems mainly from the needs of consumer legal relations and does not fully describe the specifics of information legal regulations are essential for the platform economy in the context of current rates of technological development. In view of the above, to formulate the definition of a trading digital aggregator (marketplace), it is proposed to combine approaches derived from civil and information law. Taking into account the previously identified turning points in both Russian and foreign practice, such an aggregator should be understood as a digital platform through the online storefront of which the platform operator and/or user-contractors direct a public offer to an indefinite number of persons (place offers on the Internet) regarding goods sold, works performed, and/or services provided by them, enabling contact with user-customers and/or the remote conclusion of contracts for sale, compensated work, or compensated services, as well as the possibility of making advance payments for goods, works, or services. At the same time, the online showcase is an audiovisual element of the digital platform that allows the user customer to search for goods, works, services, to familiarize themselves with information about goods, works, services to continue their correct selection. This clarification will also be useful for regulating the requirements for information about goods, works and services.

Ordinary online stores, well-known to the majority of consumers, should obviously not fall under this definition, in accordance with the goals of potential legal regulation. This is one of the fundamental issues, whose solution is a terminological innovation, since the current legislative understanding of the «aggregator owner» does not differentiate between ordinary online stores and the entire variety of digital platforms. At the same time, not only the legal nature of their activities, but also their business models themselves are strikingly different. An online store is, in fact, only a website of a specific real seller who uses this remote method of selling their goods on a par with the traditional method (offline). Marketplaces, as it has been shown in this study, are inherently built for intermediary activities, their business model is to combine many sellers on their digital platform and to create competition for their offers. Therefore it is necessary to clarify that an online store constitutes a specific type of digital platform, whose online storefront provides an



indefinite number of persons with information about the goods offered by the digital platform operator and/or related parties. This platform enables the user-customer to familiarize themselves with the seller's offer to conclude a contract of sale for such goods, to enter into the contract, and to make payment (including prepayment) through applicable forms of non-cash transactions.

At the same time, the most «transitional» form of the platform economy, distinct in its economic nature, is the classified. Unlike trading digital aggregators (marketplaces), the current legislation does not contain a concept and does not regulate the activities of information digital aggregators, which classifieds are. The regulation provided by the Law on Information practically does not address to the issues of civil circulation with the help of classifieds like registration and regulation of relations between digital platform operators and user contractors, between user customers and user contractors.

It is important to note three features of the current regulatory norms established by the Law on Information. First, only the platform, access to which is more than one hundred thousand Internet users per day, is recognized as an ad posting service. Consequently, the classifieds of smaller scale, even with 90,000 users per day, do not fall under regulation at all, although even if a tenth of that number of users concludes a transaction in the amount of ~2,000 rubles, the turnover will be ~18,000,000 rubles per day, i.e. ~540,000,000 rubles in 30 days. It turns out that the quality of products sold in this way, as well as the issues of shadow employment and legalization of such amounts of money remain outside the purview of the state.

Secondly, the Law on Information establishes a requirement for the owner of the ad posting service — he must only be a citizen of the Russian Federation who does not have citizenship of another state, or a Russian legal entity. This approach differs significantly from the approach to regulating marketplaces. At the same time, since the concept of an ad posting service is constructed through reference to the language of the posted advertisements, it may be assumed that foreign services where advertisements are posted in foreign languages do not fall under the requirements of this Law, including the requirement for citizenship of the classified owner. However, with this approach, some legal collision is noticeable in the relation of these criteria.

Thirdly, the aforementioned Law provides the Government of the Russian Federation with the opportunity to impose requirements on

“ad posting service” operators to ensure the integration and interaction of the service with Unified Identification and Authentication System and the Federal State Information System «Unified Portal of State and Municipal Services (Functions)» (transliterations: ESIA and FGIS EPGU). Therefore, it is theoretically permissible to develop this regulation in order to ensure proper recording of agreements concluded between customers and contractors through classifieds (preventing «going» into the gray area and concluding a transaction without recording on the digital platform).

In view of the above, there is an acute need for clear conceptual delimitation of classifieds specifically for the purposes of regulating the platform economy and in accordance with its inherent features, not only for information policy considerations. Then, an information digital aggregator (classified) should be understood as a digital platform on which digital platform users independently post information about offered or requested goods, works, services and which allows user contractors and user customers to establish contact for the purpose of concluding a contract, and (or) conclude a contract, and (or) pay (prepay) under the concluded contract.

The online store, marketplace and classified have been discussed above, but there is also a larger-scale phenomenon, which needs definition especially in connection with the consolidation of players: digital giants tend to combine several diverse digital platforms under a «single cloud,» offering cross-referrals to complementary services (in order to increase referrals and profits) and encouraging users for such behavior. The practice of large companies combining platforms for ordering goods/food/products/medicines, providing educational/telemedicine services, audiovisual services, courier services, etc. under their influence is well known. There arises a digital ecosystem — a set of digital platforms united by belonging to one person (one group of interdependent persons), through the joint and (or) interdependent functioning of which (including the organization of a unified system of authorization and authentication, the establishment of a coordinated system of discounts, increasing the convenience and (or) profitability of accessing several such digital platforms at the same time) the person (group of interdependent persons) attracts increased interest of the user customer, motivates them to make additional purchases, order additional services from the person (group of persons), forms additional consumer value of accessing these digital platforms. Separately, it is worth considering complex digital platforms that combine features of individual types and (or) types of digital platforms.

Thanks to the above conceptual series, we are capable to solve the priority problem of not only identifying the key actors in relations in the platform market for the purposes of law, but also of meaningfully delimiting the nature of their activities (including the services provided), which is, of course, intermediary in essence. However, even with these definitions, the conceptual model cannot yet look logically complete and systematic. In addition, an accurate legal description of the participants in legal relations «on the opposite side,» is required i.e. considering those using digital platforms to enter the trading process (on both the demand and supply side). For this purpose, it is required to name the digital platform user as such, as well as their individual varieties — as it has already been partly shown in the previous definitions, these are user contractors and user customers.

The concept of a digital platform user is generic one. Users are individuals or entities utilizing the platform for, or intending to utilize it for, transactions involving goods, works, or services. In turn, the differentiation of this concept should occur according to the nature of the relationship between the user and the operator of the digital platform, i.e. based on the purposes of its entry into legal relations and depending on «which side» it joins the platform. Consequently, a user-contractor should be recognized as such a digital platform user who is a seller, contractor or “platform worker” and places, on the basis of a remunerated contract concluded with the digital platform operator, publicly available information about the goods they wish to sell or the works (services) they wish to perform, as well as about the offers for the purchase and sale of goods, the performance of works (services), and for the conclusion of the pertinent contracts with user-customers.

At the same time, there are ample grounds to refer to the concepts of seller and service provider in their traditional meanings as established by the Consumer Rights Protection Law, that, among other things, will maintain continuity between innovative legal regulation and the well-established, time-tested, and proven legal framework. In turn, this definition itself, as can be seen, dichotomously assumes that a user-customer is a digital platform user who intends to purchase goods or works or services based on an offer posted on the digital platform by a user-contractor, or who posts a relevant request for goods or works or services on the digital platform.

It appears to be that comprehensive, systematic, empirical, and practice-oriented elaboration of legal terminology is key to enabling inte-

grated regulation of the pressing issues facing society and the state in this field. In this regard, the glossary developed in this study is based on an analysis of the successful foreign and Russian experience in regulating electronic and digital commerce. At the same time, the features of the Russian legal system and the possibility of applying pertinent definitions in related areas of law were duly considered. This glossary, therefore, reflects the key principles of legal regulation in different countries, primarily from an economic point of view (what the type of platform is as an economic question) and is adapted to the Russian legislation. The next step will be to develop a regulatory framework that will combine the proposed definitions and world experience into specific rules and regulations applicable to the platform economy in Russia. This framework will create more clear and useful regulation in all the features of this area.

#### **4. Key Principles for Regulating Platform Economy: *Primum Non Nocere***

To date, the regulatory framework governing economic and commercial activities on or through the Internet can be described as fragmented, unsystematic, and sometimes contradictory one. On the one hand, a whole layer of tax, antitrust, consumer, and information relations in the sale of goods (works, services) through the Internet is clearly regulated by legislative acts. On the other hand, each of these sectors operates with a different terminological apparatus, which defines and classifies online trading tools according to different characteristics and properties. Consequently, if civil, antitrust, and tax legislation act uniformly with respect to classic forms of trade, applying equally to each economic entity or consumer, then when relations are complicated by an «online element,» the very same legal relations are regulated differently depending on how the relevant law defines a digital platform and whether the specific online tool under consideration falls under this definition. This not only hinders the implementation of the major principles of the market economy — equality, freedom of trade, and competition — but also allows the exploitation of regulatory loopholes to evade government oversight. Other branches of law do not operate with special terminology at all, regulating platform trading on a case-by-case basis using casuistic regulatory prescriptions.

The most obvious solution to this problem is the development of a specialized federal legislative act that would consolidate and bring to

a common terminological denominator all the principles, norms, and institutions relating to the basic issues of regulating the digital platform market. This should be a law on the foundations of legal regulation of digital platform activities, aimed at systematizing legislative approaches to regulating digital commerce and at ensuring comprehensive streamlining of relations not only in this market segment, but also in the market in general within the idea about demonstrated above trends of global economic influence of digital platforms.

The regulatory core of a full-fledged legal institution is general principles of law [Frolova E.A., 2023: 200–202], and the law of digital platforms will be no exception to this pattern, since with the help of such principles individual legal rules acquire a normative value-goal-setting relationship, necessary both for their adequate joint impact on public relations and for the qualitative interpretation of these rules in law enforcement. The principles of a specific legal institution should be identified as based on the adaptation of the general principles of law to the particularities of relations arising in a specific field (in the case under research, the adaptation of the general principles of civil and commercial law to the present-day outcomes of the experience gained from the implementation of digital platforms in market relations). Clarification of these principles is necessary, since each individual norm that will be included in the consolidated legislative act must originate from and comply with them. Otherwise, it will be extremely problematic to achieve the necessary systemic regulatory effect. Considering the analysis carried out in the present study, the principles of digital commerce and platform work may include: transparency and legality of the digital platform market; equality of participants in the digital platform market; recognition and protection of consumer rights; protection of competition also; a combination of state principles of regulation and self-regulation of digital commerce and platform work; the development of the platform economy within a overall structure of the national economy.

Since the key issue in this article is precisely the regulation of digital platform activities, it is necessary to focus immediately on the designated *primum non nocere*. The latter implies the creation of a regulatory system in which state regulation is combined with self-regulation to be able to both restrain platforms from opportunism and not hinder business development. Where are these boundaries?

With regard to the state part of regulation, the key role in this case should rather relate to the powers of federal state authorities (systematic

interpretation of clauses «e,» «j,» and «o» of Article 71 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation), since the digital platform market, especially large platforms, is common for all the regions of Russia and there can be no a priori regional specifics that would affect the core regulation of the relevant relations in different regions. For example, the powers in question may include establishing minimum technical requirements for digital platforms and introducing rules for identifying digital platform users in order to maintain the stability and fairness of civil turnover as well as the reliability and validity of transactions (this also solves the tasks of the legislator in the field of tax compliance and information security). In addition, within the framework of designing the powers of state authorities, there can be considered the need to create a consolidated register of digital platforms, a state information system of digital platforms to promote reliable and safe interaction between digital platform owners (operators) and the state, on the one hand, and operators, the state and the user contractors, on the other.

Self-regulation can be expressed inversely as the calculation of the degree of state intervention that is optimal for a particular national market to achieve the previously identified goals (stability, fair trade, security, and so on), beyond which not the state, but the market institutions themselves begin to act (within the framework of their self-regulation system). This issue arises most sharply in the sphere of social public relations in the digital platform market most associated with state intervention and the restriction of the boundless desire of business for profit — in the sphere of antitrust regulation. In addition to the described above experience of South Korea, whose competitive situation in the platform market is similar to that in Russia, a few facts must be considered. Platforms providing wide access to the customer base for suppliers and sellers create both opportunities and risks of their business dependence on these market participants. This relationship — or exactly, its potential risks — often explains the state's rigid antitrust position. However, in accordance with the principle of *primum non nocere*, it is necessary to find a balance between antitrust regulation, which restrains abuses, and opening a door of opportunities for business development.

The studies on the subject rightly emphasize the complete absence of a specialized regulatory framework to suppress anti-competitive practices of digital platforms is as detrimental to the market situation as the presence of a gap or an unsystematic legal institution, since this contributes to abuse of a dominant market position on the part of digital platforms [Egorova M.A., Petrov A.A. et al., 2022: 329–343]. Such an anti-

competitive situation in the market may be characterized by the rapid growth of some entities with the absorption of others, which leads to the concentration of market power in the hands of one or a few large platforms and, accordingly, the emergence of digital «giants.» Digital platform operators may, for theirs and often self-serving purposes, contribute to the creation of unfair competition in relation to any mass segment of companies, and competitors may collude with each other, which in the end may lead to global instability of the digital market [Strowel A., Vergote J., 2017].

Nevertheless, a rigid antitrust position does not always contribute to an adequate response to the real market situation, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances. Thus, self-preferencing behavior/practices are restricted or prohibited by the antitrust legislation of a number of states, nevertheless, the impact of such behavior on the consumer market and the competitive environment is not unequivocally negative (Cheng Y., Deng F., 2023: 20–27). In particular, self-preferencing on a platform may involve competition between the platform itself and the sellers represented on it who offer similar goods or services, in this case competitive pressure is manifested in lower prices, designed to attract consumer flow and increase sales.

The policy of limiting the amount of platform commission fees is also ambiguous in its nature. A study by two specialists [Li Z., Wang G., 2024], based on data from the three largest delivery platforms Door Dash, Grubhub and Uber Eats in combination with some additional data, shows: the policy of reducing commission fees for independent restaurants, despite the declared goal of stimulating small businesses and competition, led to a decrease in orders and revenues of such restaurants compared to chain establishments. The result is due to the strategic response of delivery platforms to the regulation of commission fees. There was a decrease in the frequency of recommendations for independent restaurants by the platform and simultaneous active promotion of chain restaurants, which pay higher commission fees. In addition, due to reduced commission fees, platforms increased delivery charges in the cities where the fee limitations were in force.

As an example of unfair competition by platform operators one of the most illustrative cases in China may be cited. Thus, in 2008, Alibaba has blocked the Baidu, Google and Yahoo search engines and did not allow Baidu to display the internal pages of its Taobao platform [Fei L., 2023: 1–11]. Later, in 2013, Alibaba has suspended third-party applica-



tions associated with We Chat, disabled all its data transfer interfaces, and prohibited Taobao sellers from posting We Chat QR codes. However, in 2021, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People's Republic of China has demanded that Internet platforms unblock external links. In the same year, Alibaba was fined \$2.8 billion (approximately 4% of the company's annual revenue) by the antitrust regulator of China for abusing its dominant position over competitors. This antitrust initiative was a response to a series of blockades by Alibaba aimed at third-party applications, as well as external links to these applications. Thus, on the one hand, in China platform companies are required to develop their own operating rules [Afina Y. et al., 2024], but, on the other hand, some of their rules may attract unfavorable attention from the government.

The analysis of the situation with digital platforms in China reveals regional asymmetry in the degree of state regulation. According to the data available (Yang G. et al., 2022), the Western regions of China have a higher degree of state intervention than the Eastern ones. From the view of competition theory, this may lead to increased price rivalry between large players in the West, but an increased likelihood of monopolization in the East and abuse of large players. Therefore, it is advisable for the eastern regions to strengthen supervision over large platforms, while for the western and central regions the goal may be to create more favorable conditions for the development of platform economy and self-regulation.

These examples clearly show the initially stated dichotomy of state intervention and self-regulation, whose optimal boundary is extremely difficult to find even in the most advanced digital economies. Excessively rigid regulation is able to contribute into a reduction in the market share of a certain platform and a decrease in the quality of its functioning. At the same time, with a single manifestation of the regulatory weakness on the part of the state, businesses, by virtue of their very nature, will immediately use their opportunity to extract more profit within the framework of not formally prohibited, but unfair and anti-competitive practices.

Consequently, the question of self-regulation of the digital platform market is synonymous with the theme of their qualitative self-development, which is also beneficial to society, since only this development guarantees the absence of stagnation, the multiplication of benefits and the overall prosperity of the economy. But the system of such self-reg-

ulation must be carefully thought out and consciously introduced into the normative concept of the law of digital platforms. The state should clearly indicate its interest in the development of the platform economy, with minimal intervention in the development of digital platforms, provided that the established necessary requirements and guarantees are observed, and platforms should be given the opportunity to independently establish the basic rules of e-commerce through self-regulation, beyond the subject of state regulation. In other words, as the analysis of the three stages of the evolution of e-commerce regulation, the main principle of regulation should not be fanatical, all-pervasive technocracy, but the principle of *primum non nocere*, suggesting degree of regulatory impact should be sufficient, but so that a sufficiently large field of opportunities for constructive market development remains outside its scope. Proceeding from this general value principle, all other conceptual points of regulation of digital platform activities can be considered.

Considering the mentioned, to exclude excessive state intervention and to allow the market to actively develop in step with the rapid development of digital technologies and related business techniques, but to secure the openness and transparency of the processes in this market according to the rules established by the state, it is advisable to legalize a system of self-regulation for market participants, delegating to this system a number of significant functions.

The advanced expertise in specific branches of the real sector will allow participants in a self-regulatory institution to develop additional regulatory models suitable for a specific market, considering the area specifics (for example, a community of digital platforms in the pharmaceutical industry or in the field of remote medical services). In addition, one of the most important functions of the self-regulatory institution should be the resolution of disputes between owners, operators and user-contractors of digital platforms. The market participants themselves will be able to develop a fair mechanism for resolving disputes and ways to ensure claims satisfaction without resorting to judicial remedies. This is in line with the general trend towards the development of a system of mediation and alternative dispute resolution, encouraging amicable settlement of disputes in pre-trial proceedings. In addition, the Ministry of Justice of Russia has recently directly indicated the relevance of introducing alternative mechanisms for remote dispute resolution in the field of online commerce and online services and a corresponding bill has been drafted.

The most obvious model of self-regulation may be an institution like a digital platform council — a non-profit organization based on the membership of digital platform owners (operators) supporting representation of user contractors and user customer associations. There are institutions of this kind in foreign jurisdictions; in some cases, the domestic legislator has already delegated the development of relevant norms to non-governmental institutions, for example, in the sphere of innovative research and technological centers.

The next fundamental question that requires primary conceptual understanding before developing targeted regulatory prescriptions is platform employment. If we consider digital platforms as a way of employment, it is obvious that they often act as the main source of income for freelancers, who today could freely offer their services on the market through the global network, often with the help of several platforms at once. Nevertheless, due to the gaps in the law in this area, people find themselves facing the risk of unpaid work, when the contractor may not receive remuneration from the customer for their activity on the platform. At the same time, looking at the opposite side of the issue, there is no clear or effective procedure to ensure the tax burden on the part of freelancers and to guarantee the quality of work or services performed by them.

In light of the above, it is interesting to mention the most disorganized form of platform employment is the activity of information digital aggregators (classifieds), thus, while developing future special regulation, the greatest attention should be paid to the principles and rules of employment through their mediation.

Transactions through classifieds fall mainly under the general provisions of Civil Law on the sale of goods, works and services. However, the effect of these norms in relation to the participants in the classified market is not guaranteed. Formally, many users sell goods (works, services) according to the «personal contact» model, although in reality the search for counterparties and preparation for the transaction takes place through the digital platform using the advantages they offer, affecting both the volume and the pace of sales. In fact, classifieds become for many individuals a source of regular earnings and a form of main occupation, providing a platform for targeted, continuous and «smart» search for counterparties in real time. However, the regulation of classifieds does not correspond to the nature of their activities, since the absence of a clear system for identifying users and recording contacts and

stages of their interaction allow them to exchange benefits as if the relationship between the participants in the turnover arose randomly on a one-time basis. Among other things, this violates the principle of equality, since the users of classifieds have unjustified advantages compared to the subjects of the real sector of work and services, who conscientiously work according to the traditional «face-to-face» scheme, paying taxes and answering in rubles for the quality of their work and services.

To solve this problem, when consolidating the legislative regulation of platform work, it is necessary to provide for a more detailed regulation of trade activities and platform work through classifieds, including mandatory procedures for identifying users (using the Unified Identification and Authentication System, bank identifiers or a mobile phone number), as well as the scheme for their remote interaction in order to conclude a transaction. It has a sense to develop specific measures to regulate relations according to the «customer — contractor» model in the framework of interaction on classifieds. The absence of formal employment relations between the customer and the contractor on the digital platform must be viewed from the point of view of the growth of informal economy. At the macro level, this may negatively affect economic growth indicators, such as GDP per capita and labor productivity.

In addition, as researchers rightly point out, digital platforms that have not received a regulatory framework in this area may put their contractors in a deliberately disadvantageous position due to the lack of rules for protecting labor and workers rights (Silberman M.S., Harmon E., 2018: 950]; [Stewart A., Stanford J., 2017). This, in turn, causes instability in the platform economy itself, resulting in increased income gaps in the population (Drahokoupi J., Jepsen M., 2017]; [Healy J. et al., 2017: 246–248]; [Lehdonvirta V., 2018: 24, 26).

Speaking about specific measures, the following conclusions may be suggested to help in solving the identified problems. Platform workers who make a living by providing goods, services and works via digital platforms should be recognized as individuals registered as: individual entrepreneurs, payers of tax on professional income (self-employed) (see point 2 in the Table 1 above), at last as platform workers. Registration (initial identification and authentication) of individuals employed on platforms (user-contractors) should be carried out in ways that promise the reliability of information about them for the purpose of further relations with consumers. This may be registration using a mobile phone number belonging to an individual, as well as, at the choice of the

user-contractor, through: (1) the Unified Identification and Authentication System or (2) other technical means that the appropriate federal executive agency shall determine. Subsequent access of an individual to the platform can be carried out using a mobile phone number belonging to the individual.

Registration of platform employed and maintaining a unified register of platform employed, and providing digital platform operators with access to it may be entrusted to the Federal Tax Service of Russia, to consolidate all information about similar taxpayers (it is also responsible for keeping the Unified State Register of Legal Entities and the Unified State Register of Individual Entrepreneurs, the register of the self-employed). The fee for registration as a platform employed may be paid on principles similar to the patent taxation system, i.e. the amount of the fee for registration as a platform employed is differentiated according to the type of activities. At the same time, the platform fees should be lower than the fees under the patent taxation system, to stimulate participants in this new sphere of the market. Even if concluding an agreement on the use of another digital platform, re-registration of a platform employed who has already been included in the unified register is not required, otherwise the excessive administrative barrier may hinder market development. The possibility should be ensured to verify data-personal identifiers-taxpayer identity through the exchange of information and digital interaction of the Federal Tax Service with digital platforms, which is fully consistent with the previously designated general vector of *primum non nocere*.

For the efficacy of public administration processes, a balance of public and private interests has to be constantly maintained (tax interests of the state, quasi-labor interests of the platform employed, consumer interests of citizens). Thus, digital platforms should report on all transactions made by user-contractors, with a frequency established by law, exchanging information with tax authorities through digital services.

Finally, a question similar in nature to issues related to antitrust regulation is the need to moderate the content on digital platforms, i.e., preventing and suppressing the monopoly on the dissemination of information. As far as content is concerned, one can have in mind both moderation by the state and the possibility of moderation by the digital platforms themselves. For example, in the United States platforms can independently establish their internal regulations and therefore bear minimal legal responsibility for the actions of users and the information

they post. In addition, websites and online services are not responsible for third-party content and their decisions on content filtering.

## **Conclusion**

The diachronic analysis of Russian and foreign experiences reveals that the integration of the platform economy into present-day legal frameworks presents a number of unresolved challenges. Addressing these issues requires continued and coordinated efforts of the state, society, the researchers and expert communities, businesses, and consumer groups. Only through collaborative engagement may be balanced legal solutions be developed for the evolving realities of the platform economy. The vector proposed in this article stems from the need to achieve the goals of stability, transparency, security and permanent development of the platform economy as a new way (form) of organizing the market, taking into consideration a number of core patterns found in Russia and abroad. This vector does not claim absolute accuracy and infallible truth, but its direction is unequivocally characterized by the desire to find a general balance for the common good: a balance of public and private interests, a balance of state intervention and self-regulation, a balance of conservative security guarantees and the legitimate pursuit of progress.

Due to the prevailing legal uncertainty in the regulation of platform-based economic activities and the increasing significance of digital platforms, this article proposes a conceptual framework for the legal regulation of the platform economy. This framework is grounded in a typology of key definitions and the systematic analysis of foreign experiences, adapted to context of the Russian legal system. The peculiarity of the approach lies in the comprehensive approach to defining and classifying various types of platforms, and in the consideration the interests of all stakeholders. Recognizing the platform economy's exponential growth, this legal approach offers a flexible framework and clear rules for all participants, without getting bogged down in sector-specific details.

The negative consequences of rigid regulation of digital platforms initiated at the current stage of legislation development, as well as the negative effects of the absence of regulation in some areas of the platform market, still have to be assessed economically. Nevertheless, one thing is already clear — a legislative solution to consolidate comprehensive regulation within the institution of digital platform law is urgently needed, it is in line with the historic trends in the development of the platform economy, and such a solution is a matter of time.

The conducted research offers a basis for discussion on the basic principles that are likely to have positive fruits and therefore can be used as a conceptual basis for further legislative developments in this area. First, without a legally correct and uniform terminological understanding of the phenomena in the platform market, it is impossible to begin conceptualizing potential principles of legal regulation, since these principles assume a focus specifically on the subjects (platforms and their types) and objects (services, employment, etc.) that have not yet been legally defined in the Russian legal system. Secondly, the principles that will be laid down in the conceptual basis of consolidated regulation must correspond to the main tracks of the analysis of the experience accumulated to date in the development of e-commerce and the platform economy: protection of competition, protection of consumer rights, protection of personal data, and platform employment.

In the present study, a conceptual approach to the legal regulation of the platform economy is proposed; it is based on the key terms typology (digital platform, marketplace, classified, platform operator, etc.) and the systematization of foreign experience (for example, the EU experience in regulating digital services and digital markets), adapted to Russian conditions.

Further efforts should focus on the development of regulatory mechanisms — mandating transparency in ranking algorithms, introducing platform liability for the dissemination of inaccurate information, and establishing robust dispute resolution processes between platform participants. This study aims to provide foundation for such efforts, facilitating the formation of a holistic and positive system of legal regulation of the platform economy in Russia, considering both current and future challenges and opportunities associated with the development of digital technologies.



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